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Abstract: Routing Protocol for Low power and Lossy network (RPL) topology attacks can downgrade
the network performance significantly by disrupting the optimal protocol structure. To detect such
threats, we propose a RPL-specification, obtained by a semi-auto profiling technique that constructs a
high-level abstract of operations through network simulation traces, to use as reference for verifying
the node behaviors. This specification, including all the legitimate protocol states and transitions
with corresponding statistics, will be implemented as a set of rules in the intrusion detection agents,
in the form of the cluster heads propagated to monitor the whole network. In order to save resources,
we set the cluster members to report related information about itself and other neighbors to the
cluster head instead of making the head overhearing all the communication. As a result, information
about a cluster member will be reported by different neighbors, which allow the cluster head to do
cross-check. We propose to record the sequence in RPL Information Object (DIO) and Information
Solicitation (DIS) messages to eliminate the synchronized issue created by the delay in transmitting
the report, in which the cluster head only does cross-check on information that come from sources
with the same sequence. Simulation results show that the proposed Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
has a high accuracy rate in detecting RPL topology attacks, while only creating insignificant overhead
(about 6.3%) that enable its scalability in large-scale network.
Keywords: 6LoWPAN; RPL; internal threats; topology attacks; specification-based; IDS
1. Introduction
Routing Protocol for Low power and Lossy network (RPL) is a protocol developed specifically for
the 6LoWPAN network, in order to bring the concept of Internet of Things (IoT) to the real life. RPL
has many advantages such as the energy efficiency, optimal routing and minimal overhead, which
makes it outperform other previous routing protocol [1]. As a result, the protocol is also proposed to
apply in a lot of other situations such as Smart Grid and so on. For the overall operation of the protocol
as well as the basic concepts of routing messages like DIO, DIS, and the trickle algorithm, readers can
refer to [1–8] for more detail.
Internal threats on RPL-based network is a challenge due to the weak physical protections of
the nodes, no centralized administration, low capability node that make strong cryptography not
applicable, and lack of node co-operation. Internal threats can be categorized into two types: the
performance attacks and the topology attacks [2]. The performance attacks focus on manipulating
the network performance directly, for instance, making an adverse source dropping all the packets
(black hole attack), dropping some of the packets (selective forwarding attack), or adding delay to
the forwarding. On the other hand, topology attacks involve node operation to disrupt the optimal
network topology, for example, creating loops, attracting traffic, or generating heavy overhead. Internal
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attackers often combine these two types of attacks to boost the effect of their attacks, for example,
using topology attack to gain the traffic towards a malicious source and then manipulating those traffic
through this source’s performance.
The main focus of this paper is the topology attack. Several RPL topology attacks such as Sinkhole,
Rank, Local Repair, Neighbor, and DIS attacks have been reported to have significant bad impact on
network performance [3,5,8]. Cryptographic solutions cannot prevent the internal threats once the
attackers tamper the nodes and obtain the secure keys [2]. Moreover, some security modes of RPL
are considered impractical without the use of public key cryptography, which is believed to be too
expensive in common [9]. Tsao et al. [9] also provided several countermeasures for a number of RPL
attacks, however, such countermeasures mostly change the operations to overcome the attack impacts
rather than specifying and eliminating the malicious sources, which can create long term issues for
the network performance. Therefore, it is necessary to have an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to
monitor and detect the compromised nodes.
In RPL-based network, the two most applicable IDS approaches for detecting the internal threats
are the anomaly-based and specification-based. Anomaly-based IDS identifies a node as intrusion
when this node has too much deviation in behaviors compare to the normal baselines. The most
important aspect for the accurateness of an anomaly-based IDS is to define the normal or legitimate
behaviors and the threshold for the deviations, in which any node acts more than this threshold will be
identified as the malicious. Anomaly-based IDS is used widely in securing routing protocols in wireless
sensor and wireless ad hoc network from the internal threats. However, the work follows this approach
in securing RPL is only in the initial step. Raza et al. [6] proposed SVELTE, the first anomaly-based IDS
for securing the RPL protocol with two phases, including collecting and analyzing the IDS data. In the
collecting phase, the Destination Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG) root (also the monitoring
node of all nodes in the network) will request its network members to send information about itself
and its neighbors. The information that each member has to send includes the RPL Instance ID, the
DODAG ID, the DODAG Version Number, all neighbors and their corresponding ranks, the parent ID,
the node’s rank and a timestamp. Once the information received, the monitoring node moves to the
analyzing phase by using such data to form a network map, evaluate the rank consistency and check
the legitimacy of the rank rules between any parent-child pair. This anomaly-based IDS also focuses
on monitoring the deviation between normal and anomaly nodes behaviors. However, in case of
topology attacks, malicious nodes perform similarly to normal nodes in terms of sending and receiving
messages, hence, the difference in whether a node following the protocol rules cannot be effectively
detected by the anomaly-based IDS.
On the other hand, the specification-based IDS detects the attackers if they do not follow a
specified behavior reference of the routing protocol. This approach is effective in detecting the
topology attacks because it can point out directly when the adverse nodes break the protocol rules.
So far, specification-based detection has been applied to many similar situations, including securing
different sensor and ad hoc network protocols [10,11]. In such environment, the routing protocols
are usually profiled manually by experts through its theoretical specifications. There are also several
RPL specification [4,7], but none of them satisfied the purpose of detecting the RPL topology attacks.
In detail, in [4], we proposed only a prototype of RPL specification, which is lack of verification and
implementation. On the other hand, the profile of RPL in [7] is only for the purpose of conformance
testing, which mainly looks at verifying the implementation of the protocol from its documentation.
Such profile is not effective when applying for the detection purpose because unlike the conformance
tester, the IDS will not have the self-view of the node behaviors; its view is instead reflected from
other IDS agent’s report. The differences in the views bring issues like synchronization, data loss, data
falsifying and so on, which make the profile not feasible to follow. Moreover, that RPL profile does
not reflect any crucial behavior that the attackers may employ to attack the network performance,
for example, a node needs to propagate consistent ranks with what are reflected from its neighbors,
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a node needs to follow the rank rule in any case, or a node needs to not generate redundant
control messages.
Profiling technique also needs to be considered. Previous works mainly employed manually
profiling techniques, which are based on the expert understanding of the protocol. This method is,
however, lack of fast and accurate profile generations for a particular protocol, as well as difficult to
verify. To overcome this problem, the authors in [12] propose a technique that based on Inductive Logic
Programming (ILP) method to induce a hypothesis from individual observations and background
knowledge. The authors collect examples of the protocol executions through extensive simulation
traces and derive an abstract model of protocol behavior out of that. This solution has the advantage
of fast profiling generation with the ability of validating the correctness of such specification.
This paper is the continuation of our on-going research on IDS for detecting the internal threats in
IP-connected wireless sensor network [2–5], where we identified and evaluated prominent internal
threats and proposed a general IDS framework to detect them. This work is the next concrete step to
develop, implement, and verify a specification-based IDS to detect the topology attacks in RPL-based
network. In detail, we first summarized the prominent topology attacks known to RPL from previous
research [2,3,5,6,8]. We then profile the RPL operation based on a semi-auto specifying technique,
which is inspired from [12] and involves the use of simulation trace files to generate an Extended Finite
State Machines (EFSM—a Finite State Machine with statistic information about transitions and states)
for RPL. Such profile will be transformed as a set of rules applied for checking monitoring data from the
network nodes regarding relevant properties. We employ the cluster monitoring architecture, in which
the network will be divided into multiple smaller clusters, the IDS agent will stay as the head in the
center of each cluster to monitor the cluster members according to the set of rules implemented. This
architecture can decrease the storage and computation work load for the IDS agents, while keeping
a low rate of overhead. The simulation results show that our IDS can effectively detect most of the
topology attacks with small amount of overhead.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a short summary of prominent
known RPL topology attacks. Section 3 describes two phases of building our specification-based IDS,
including profiling the RPL protocol and implementing it into the network. Section 4 evaluates the
proposed solution and Section 5 discusses further consideration of expanding the IDS to deal with
more kind of internal threats. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Topology Attacks on RPL
Our works [2–5] have discussed some of the particular topology attacks on RPL including the
Rank, the Local repair, the Neighbor, and the DIS attack. Attacks with the same nature in wireless
sensor or ad hoc network can also apply for RPL, as discussed in [2,6]. We will summarize some of the
prominent attacks from those that work as the targets for our IDS to detect as follow.
‚ The Rank attack: after the attack is triggered, the malicious node changes the way it processes
the DIO messages from other neighbors so that it will get the node with the worst rank as the
preferred parent. This kind of attack will create un-optimized route for all the packets that go
through the malicious nodes, and it also creates more traffic to the victim.
‚ The Sinkhole attack: the malicious node will propagate its rank with a good value, normally the
same rank of the sink. As a result, its neighbors will select it as their preferred parent and send
traffic to that node. The Sinkhole attack is often combined with the Selective Forwarding attack
(a performance attack which is out of scope of this paper) to drop all the traffic attracted.
‚ The Local repair attack: after the attack is triggered, the malicious node starts broadcasting local
repair messages periodically, though there is no problem with the link quality around the node.
Other node upon receiving the local repair messages will need to recalculate the route that is
related to the malicious nodes. This kind of attack creates more control overhead messages, as well
as some packet dropping because of temporarily unavailable route.
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‚ The Neighbor attack: after the attack is triggered, the malicious node will replicate any DIO
messages that it receives and broadcast them again. The victims who receive this type of messages
may think that it has a new neighbor, which is not in range. Moreover, if the new neighbor
advertises a good rank then the victims may request it as the preferred parent and change the
route to the out range neighbors.
‚ The DIS attack: after the attack is triggered, the malicious nodes will send the DIS messages
periodically to its neighbors. The DIS messages can be sent two ways, which will lead to a different
response from the receivers. The first way is to broadcast DIS, the receivers upon receive will
have to reset the DIO timer as they realize that there is something with the topology around.
The second way is to unicast this DIS message to all nodes in the neighbor list, the receivers upon
receive will unicast DIO message to the sender. Both of these ways add more control overhead on
the network.
All of these presented attacks are practically shown to affect significantly RPL performance [2,3,5].
The attacks can be summarized in Table 1 below.
Table 1. Summary of potential internal threats towards RPL topology performance.
Type of Attacks Attack Descriptions Misuse Goal
Rank attack An attacker does not send packets to preferred parent Route disruption—redirect traffic
Sinkhole attack The attacker propagates the sink’s rank as its rank Redirect traffic
Local repair An attacker sends local repair periodically Route disruption, resourceconsumption
Neighbor attack An attacker forward the DIO messages to otherneighbors without changing
False route, route disruption,
resource consumption
DIS attack
The attackers send DIS messages with a fake IP
address so let the other node have to generate the
DIO messages so increase the overhead
Resource consumption
3. A specification-Based IDS for RPL to Detect the Topology Attacks
In this section, we introduce our specification-based IDS for RPL to detect the topology attacks as
presented in the previous section. Our solution consists of two phases. In the first phase, we specify
the RPL in the EFSM form using the ILP technique. In detail, we simulate the RPL network operation
in the normal condition extensively to get the trace files. We then define all the states that relate
to the network topology stability and analyze the transitions between those states based on similar
algorithms presented in [12]. As discussed in Section 1, the approach of using the trace file to generate
the operation rules has multiple advantages to compare with the manual approach of profiling a
protocol from its documents. The generated module cannot only be improved by expert knowledge
added from understanding the protocol, but also be used as a verification module for the detection.
We also record the statistic of the states and their transitions as we know that the more transitions
between the states, the more instable the network is. In the second phase, we translate the knowledge
of the RPL profile of the detection algorithms that are implemented in the IDS agents. We discuss the
process from IDS placement, how the monitoring data are collected, and how the IDS agents obtain
the detections.
3.1. Profiling RPL
To profile the RPL protocol, we used the traces of legitimate protocol behaviors generated from
the Contiki-Cooja simulation platform [13]. We only consider behaviors that related to the optimal and
stable topology, in particular the route establishment and the route maintenance processes.
We develop two simple algorithms to extract the states, transitions, and their statistics as below.
Algorithm 1 is to analyze the potential states, transitions and statistics in each node while Algorithm 2
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is to merge all the different operations found in each node, which are generated from Algorithm 1, to
form an abstract of RPL node operations.
Algorithm 1. Extracting states and transitions
Require: Trace file from simulation with marking relevant states
1: for k = 1 to n do
2: for i = 1 to Nk ´ 1 do
3: PState = StateExtract(Ni) // Get previous state from Ni
4: CState = StateExtract(Ni+1) // Get current state from Ni+1
5: CTran = NewTran(PState, CState) // Get current transition
6: if CTran R AllTrans[k] do
7: AllTrans[k] = Add(AllTrans[k], CTran) // Add transition to list
8: AllTransStatistic[k] = AddStatistic(AllTrans[k], CTran) // Add statistic
9: else
10: AllTransStatistic[k] = AddStatistic(AllTrans[k], CTran) // Add statistic
11: end if
12: end for
13: end for
At the end of Algorithm 1, we generate a set of concrete states, transitions, and corresponding
statistic data for each node. For example, we extract the relevant trace to node 3 and observe the
following messages: [Node 3 broadcasts DIS—Node 3 receives DIO from node 5—Node 3 receives
DIO from node 7—Node 3 receives DIO from node 9—Node 3 calculates the preferred parent and
send a new DIO]. This trace then will be recorded as [Node 3 broadcast DIS—Node 3 receives DIOs
(3 times)—Node 3 process received DIO—Node 3 send a new DIO]. Figure 1 illustrates an example of
the results recorded from Algorithm 1 for node 3. As can be seen from the figure, the flow of the in
and out control messages to node 3 is represented in CM [3] on the left, while the transition merge and
relevant statistics are represented in AllTrans [3] on the right.
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Figure 1. Exa ple of the results of Algorith 1.
The results of the Algorithm 1 are sets of states, transitions and corresponding statistic for each
node. Algorithm 2 will merge those sets one by one to form an abstract of RPL operation. The results
of the Algorithm 1 are sets of states, transitions and corresponding statistic for each node. Algorithm 2
will merge those sets one by one to form an abstract of RPL operation.
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Algorithm 2. Form the specification-based IDS for RPL
Require: AllTrans[k], AllTransStatistic[k], k = 1,..., n
1: FinalSpe = AllTrans[1]
2: FinalSpeStatistic = AllTransStatistic[1]
3: for k = 1 to n do
4: FinalSpe = Merge(FinalSpe, AllTrans[k])
5: FinalSpeStatistic = Merge(FinalSpeStatistic, AllTransStatistic[k]
6: end for
The Merge function first compares the states that two Transitions have. It only adds to the FinalSpe
the states and transitions that it does not have yet. It also compares the statistic pattern and only record
the pattern with significant different trend.
At the end of Algorithm 2, we obtain a Specification-based module as shown in Figure 2 below.Information 2016, 7, 25 
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Figure 2. Specification-based IDS for RPL through trace file analysis.
The generated RPL specification module consists of 8 states: The sending DIS, sending DIO,
receiving DIO (DIOr), sending no-change DIO, processing DIOs, sending new (changed) DIO, Sending DAO,
repair, and new node joining. From the statistical data recorded, we obtain the following observations:
(i) Nodes only move to the Sending DIS state when it first starts, joins, or involves in a link
repair procedure. As a result, nodes only visit the Sending DIS state few times during the
network performance.
(ii) Nodes in the center tend to have more transitions to nodes in the border. The reasons are that
center nodes have more neighbors than border nodes, while their neighbors are also more likely
to update the routing information than the border nodes’ neighbors.
(iii) In the processing DIOs state, nodes have to strictly follow the rank rule.
(iv) After a long enough time of runni g, when the network topol gy becomes stable, the node will
visit mo tly the Sending o-cha ge DIO state. However, such visit is not too often, becaus the DIO
trickle time s always extended in a stable etwork.
(v) The five states ending DIS, sendi , sending DAO, repair, and new node joi ing indicate
the instability of the network topol gy. When the node is in one of these states, the transitions are
exp cted to happen more often, b cause the DIO trickle time is set to minimu .
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In the next section, we will use the knowledge obtained from this section to design and implement
a Specification-based IDS in the RPL network.
3.2. Design and Implementation of the Specification-Based IDS for RPL-Based Network
3.2.1. Placement of IDS Agents
IDS agents are placed into the network through the three common methods, the host-based,
network-based or the hybrid. The host-based IDS implements the detection module in every node of
the network. Each node will act as a monitoring node to monitor the operation of all of its neighbors.
This method creates heavy overhead and requires a lot of memory and calculation resources from
the node. On the other hand, the network-based IDS implement the detection module at the sink.
The necessary information for detection decision will be asked, collected from all the nodes in the
network to send to the sink. This method also creates extra communication overhead, and does not
guarantee that the sink will have all the information it needs, for instance, in the case when partial of
the network is compromised, information from such part will not be able for the sink anymore.Information 2016, 7, 25 
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The monitoring architecture employed in this paper is the hybrid or the clustering architecture,
which we found to have multiple advantages to compare with the other approaches. An illustration
for this architecture is given in Figure 3 below. In this approach, the network is divided into clusters,
each has similar size in t rms of the number of nodes. In each clust r, there will be one clust r head,
which has direct communicati n to all the other nodes in this cluster. Each cluster head i placed in
a w y that it ca cover th whole netwo k, and allow every node in the network to find the cluster
head to register for the monitoring pu poses. The number of nodes in each cluster is depending on
the network density in this area. More detail abo t the clu ter-based IDS design nd algorithms to
select the cluster hea p sition can be found in [14]. In this design, we will place the IDS agent in
eac cluster head. In detail, they will r cord relevant i formation of its cluster m mbers either through
overhearing th communication or the members report themselves upon requested. Such recorded ata
will be checked by the built-in IDS algorithms also integrated i the cluster head to detect malicious
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behaviors. There is always a trade-off on choosing which algorithms to apply, for example, strong
algorithms may detect the threats better, however, they will consume more resource and require more
data storage, which shorten the lifetime of the cluster head. In this paper, the built-in IDS algorithms
(the details are in Section 3.2.3) are obtained from the RPL profile in Section 3.1, which only require
simple threshold-comparison on collected data, so they are light-weight and will not affect significantly
the operation of the cluster heads. Moreover, as being assigned the data collection and decision making
roles, cluster head can be usually provided more resource like battery power and memory to deal with
such additional IDS work. This architecture can reduce the communication overhead significantly to
compare with the host-based method, while providing more robust decision than the network-based
method due to full and quick access to the detection information it needs.
3.2.2. IDS Data Collection
Similar to [6], we do not make the cluster head to change to promiscuous mode to eavesdrop
all the radio communication around because it will drain its battery out quickly, while the obtained
information in this case also has only limited use. Instead, we make the cluster head to request
its members to report its topology information periodically. The period is set up depends on the
particular scenario. Once the members receive such request, they need to send their neighbor lists with
corresponding ranks, the preferred parent, and its own rank. Such information are already stored in
the routing table of each node for the purpose of selecting its preferred parent, therefore, there will be
no additional cost on storing and computation. By doing so, we save the resource for the cluster head
while expanding the view to even nodes which are outside the cluster.
As nodes report information of its neighbors, a cross-check of the collected data is required.
However, the cross-check process suffers from the synchronization issue when the IDS agent cannot
check whether the data from the neighbor is collected later or sooner than data from the node itself.
This issue was first pointed out by Matsunaga et al. [15], through the example illustrated in Figure 4 as
follows. Let A is a normal node in the network and N is its neighbor. At time t1 when A broadcasting
its DIO, its rank is 3 and N record rank of A as 3 in its memory. At time t2, A updates its rank to 4 but
because it is not the time to send the new DIO yet, so A does not send any new DIO, and N still store
the rank of A as 3. Soon after t2, at t3, the root requests nodes to send IDS information. In this case,
node A will send its rank as 4 (its current rank) while node N informs the root that the actual rank of A
is 3. The rank information of node A that it and node N reported is not the same because the recording
time was not synchronized. This synchronization issue makes the root consider that the rank of A is
not consistent, hence detect A as malicious node, which create a false detection.
Matsunaga et al. [15] proposes an improvement by letting the nodes send only the rank information
in its latest broadcast DIO, rather than the latest rank it has. Moreover, they separate the rank
inconsistent threshold when detecting the consistency, in which if there is time difference when
receiving the report rank (information from the node itself) and the monitor rank (information from the
node’s neighbors), the threshold will be higher than it in the case there is no time difference. However,
this solution still cannot overcome the synchronization issue in some of the cases. For instance, based
on Figure 4, in Figure 5, we added node P as node A’s parent and N is the neighbor of both A and P.
At time t1, P has rank 2, A has rank 3. In time t’1, P update its rank to 3, hence it broadcasts this new
information to the neighbors. At time t2, node A receives this information and increase its new rank to
4 without updating its rank for the neighbor yet. At time t3, the root request every node to send IDS
information. According to Matsunaga, P will report its rank as 3 because it already sends the new DIO
before the root request. On the other hand, node A will also report its rank as 3 because its next DIO is
scheduled after the root asking for report. Both of these reports are considered consistent under the
view of node N. Now, A and P has the same rank as 3, both are considered consistent, but according to
the rank rule, P is the parent of A so it should have a lower rank than A. As a result, both A and P may
be considered as malicious source.
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In order to solve the synchronization issue as raised above, we propose to add the sequence
number information in the DIO and DIS messages in order to make the cross-check more reliable.
We will use the reserved bytes in the DIO and DIS message format (readers can refer to [1] for the
format of DIO and DIS message) for this purpose, so the actual size of such messages will remain the
same. The synchronization issue is solved because the sequence number indicates specifically which
packets the information belongs to; hence the agent can cross-check only the sources that have the
same sequence to eliminate any mistake caused from the unsynchronized communication.
Finally, the IDS agent will record the following information for each of its members:
‚ DIS sequence, number of DIS received
‚ DIO sequence, number of DIO received
‚ List of neighbors, each neighbor has
# Node ID
# Rank
# The sequence of the DIO that provides this info
# DIS sequence, number of DIS received
# DAO sequence, number of DAO received, and a parent bit (if there is no DAO message
sent, or if there is a DAO message require to remove the parent relationship, then the
parent bit is 0, otherwise it will be set to 1)
‚ Preferred parent ID
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Such information will be collected and sent periodically to the IDS agents. Upon receiving the
IDS data, the IDS agents will apply relevant algorithms to detect any malicious behaviors of the
cluster members.
3.2.3. Detection at the IDS Agent
Algorithm 3 shown a detection algorithm that we developed based on the RPL profile discussed
in Section 3.1 and the collected data given in Section 3.2.2. The detection algorithm would be executed
as an IDS agent at Cluster head. The algorithm consists of 5 modules:
‚ Module 1: Checking the DIS message, alarm if the received DIS is fake or sending too much.
‚ Module 2: Checking the sequence of DIO message, alarm if the received DIO is fake
‚ Module 3: Checking the rank consistency, alarm if the rank of the member is different to the
rank reported by its neighbors or the cluster head, given the same DIO sequence. Penalize the
neighbors if they do not have the latest DIO message. Alarm if there is any DIO message reported
by the neighbors or cluster head that has newer DIO sequence than the member itself
‚ Module 4: Check the rank rule between every pair of parent and child
‚ Module 5: Check the instability of the network area around a member through the relevant states
and observations in Section 3.1. Penalize if there is any instability.
The detail algorithm is as below.
Algorithm 3. Detecting topology attacks from cluster head view
Module 1: Check whether DIS message is illegitimate
1: On receiving DIS {
2: record SourceID, DIS_seq_new;
3: DIS_count[SourceID]++;
4: if DIS_seq_new ď DIS_seq_current then
5: alarm fake DIS;
6: else DIS_seq_current = DIS_seq_new
7: end if
8: if DIS_count[SourceID] > thresholdDIS_count then
9: alarm DIS attack;
10: end if }
Module 2: Check whether there is any fake DIO
1: On receiving DIO {
2: record SourceID, DIO_seq_new, rank;
3: DIO_count[SourceID]++;
4: if DIO_seq_new ď DIO_seq_current then
5: alarm fake DIO;
6: else DIO_seq_current = DIO_seq_new
7: end if }
Module 3: Check the rank inconsistency
1: After receiving reports from all of the members {
2: for each Member in Cluster do {
3: if Member.DIO_seq < CH.Member.DIO_seq then
4: alarm fake DIO;
5: end if
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Algorithm 3. Detecting topology attacks from cluster head view
Module 3: Check the rank inconsistency
6: for each Neighbour in Member.Neighbour do
7: if Member.DIO_seq < Neighbour.Member.DIO_seq then
8: alarm fake DIO;
9: else if Member.DIO_seq < Neighbour.Member.DIO_seq then
10: Neighbour.fault = Neighbour.fault + 0.5 //penalised
11: else if Member.DIO_seq = Neighbour.Member.DIO_seq then
12: if Member.rank != Neighbour.Member.Rank then
13: alarm fake DIO;
14: end if
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for } }
Module 4: Check the rank rule
1: for each Member in Cluster do
2: if Member.rank + MinHopRankIncrease < Member.parent.rank then
3: alarm rank attack;
4: end if
5: for each Neighbour in Member.Neighbour do {
6: if Member.DAO.parent == 1 then
7: if Member.rank – MinHopRankIncrease > Member.child.rank then
8: alarm rank attack;
9: end if
10: end if
11: end for
12: end for }
Module 5: Check the stability of the network part which relate to a cluster member
//Setting the initial stability evaluation for each member in cluster
1: for each Member in Cluster do
2: Member.stability = thresholdstability
3: end for
//Penalise if stability condition is observed to be not satisfied
4: for each Member in Cluster {
5: if IsRepairAfterPeriod then
6: Member.stability -= 2 // penalised –2 on stability
7: end if
8: if IsChangeAfterPeriod(Member.DIO) || IsChangeAfterPeriod(Member.DAO) ||
IsNewNodeJoiningAfterPeriod then
9: Member.stability -= 0.5 // penalised 0.5 on stability
10: end if }
//Checking every period of time
11: if IsCheckingPeriod then
12: for each Member in Cluster do
13: if Member.stability < 0 then
14: alarm Member instability;
15: end if
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Algorithm 3. Detecting topology attacks from cluster head view
Module 5: Check the stability of the network part which relate to a cluster member
16: if Member.fault > thresholdfault then
17: alarm Member fault; // member fault is recorded in module 3
18: end if
19: end for
20: end if
The thresholds used in the algorithm are summarized in Table 2 below.
Table 2. The thresholds used in the algorithm.
Threshold Meaning
thresholdDIS_count
Alarm if a node visit the DIS state more than
thresholdDIS_count in the monitoring time.
thresholdfault Alarm if a node not updating info from the neighbours
thresholdinstability
Alarm if node visit the instability states S1, S5, S6, S7, S8
more than a thresholdinstability in the monitoring time
4. Evaluation Results and Discussion
To investigate further the effectiveness of the IDS, we implement the five types of attacks as
discussed in Section 3 in Contiki-Cooja [13] and see how the IDS module can detect them. This session
first presents the simulation setup, evaluation metrics, and then discuss about the results achieved.
4.1. Simulation Set up
Our simulation scenario consists of a total of 100 nodes placed randomly in a 600 ˆ 600 m area,
each node has a transmission range of 50 m. The topology setup is shown in Figure 6 below. There is
one sink placed in the center (node ID: 1 with dot pattern in Figure 6) and 11 IDS cluster heads (the
grey nodes) to cover the operation of the remaining 88 nodes in the network (the white nodes). Every
node sends packet to the sink at the rate of 1 packet every 60 s. Data specified in Section 3.2.2 is
collected and sent to the cluster heads every 2 min. We implement the specification-based module
from Section 3 in the IDS cluster heads to analyze the collected trace data. The thresholds are set up
based on analyzing the statistical data in the trace files with the following values: thresholdDIS_count = 3,
thresholdfault = 2, and thresholdinstability = 10.
We implemented each of the five types of attacks as discussed in Section 2 in random positions of
88 normal senders. For each of the attack scenario, there will be one random node in the 88 normal
nodes to be injected the relevant attack code. The attacks are initiated after 3 min when the topology
establishment phase is done. The summary of the simulation parameters is shown in Table 3 below.
Table 3. The simulation parameters.
Parameters Value
Simulation platform Cooja Contiki 2.6
Number of nodes 99 senders, 1 sink
Number of cluster head 11
Number of attackers 1
Traffic model Constant bit rate
Sending rate 1 packet every 60 s
IDS require info every 2 min
Simulation run time 30 min
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4.2. Evaluation Metrics
Evaluation metrics include metric to evaluate the accuracy of the IDS and the level of overhead
to compare with the network operating without IDS. Metrics to evaluate the accuracy of an IDS is
mainly the True Positive Rate and the False Positive Rate. The True Positive rate can also be called
the Detection Rate as it shows how good the IDS is at detecting the malicious behaviors. On the other
hand, the False Positive rate represents the falsification of the IDS as it shows how bad the IDS can be
at falsifying to detect a legitimate behaviors. The formula to calculate these two metrics are:
True Positive Rate pTPRq: TPrate “ TPTP` FN
False Positive Rate pFPRq: FNrate “ FPFP` TN
where
‚ True Positive (TP): is the total correctly detected malicious behaviours. This happens when the
IDS correctly raise alert on a malicious vent.
‚ Fals Positive (FP): happens when the IDS erroneously raises a false alarm over a legitimate
behaviour in he network.
‚ True Negative (TN): happens when the IDS correctly judging a legitimate behaviour as normal.
‚ False Negative (FN): happens when the IDS erroneously judging a malicious event as normal.
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The impacts to the resource consumption are evaluated utilizing the network energy usage and
node power consumption as presented in [6]. The formula to calculate these metrics are as follow:
Energy usage pmJq
“ p19.5mAˆ transmit` 21.8mAˆ listen` 1.8mAˆCPU
` 0.0545ˆ LPMq ˆ 3 V{4096ˆ 8
(1)
Power Consumption pmWq “ Energyusage pmJq
Time psq (2)
The more energy and power the network uses, the shorter its lifetime is.
4.3. Simulation Results and Discussion
4.3.1. Detection Efficency
We divided the attacks into two groups which have similar results when detected by our IDS.
The first group contains the Rank attack, Sinkhole attack, and Neighbor attack—the threats which are
detected only by the specified states. The second group includes the local repair and the DIS attacks,
which involved both the specification states and statistic collection to reveal.
Table 4 below shows the TPR and FPR of the Rank attack, Sinkhole attack and the Neighbor attack
after 4 min, when the Rank attack already initiated (at the third minute) and the IDS has just collected
the first two IDS data packets from its neighbor. As can be seen from the table, we obtained ideal IDS
results, where the TPR is 100% and the FPR is 0%. These results can be explained as follows.
The DIO sequence checking in Modules 2 and 3 ensure that there is no inconsistency in DIO and
Rank information between the IDS data reported by the neighbours. As a result, the cluster head will
know most of the parent—child relationships and their accurate corresponding ranks.
Regarding the Rank attack, given its nature which is choosing the worst parent as the preferred
parent and changing it frequently, the cluster head will detect the behaviour of breaking the rank rule
and raise alarm about the child node for choosing inappropriate parent. Therefore, the Rank attack is
detected quickly with high accuracy.
Regarding the Sinkhole attack, our implementation lets the attacker keeps informing that it has
the rank of the Sink to attract its neighbours. As the attacker is not the actual Sink, before initiating the
attacks, it would have a preferred parent. Moreover, this parent-child relationship would be recorded
by one of the cluster heads. When the attacker manipulates its new rank to the Sink’s rank, such
relationship will become illegal, because the child now has a better rank than the parent. This illegal
relation will be detected by Module 4 of our IDS.
Regarding the neighbor attack, the neighbor attack involves some DIO replications, which will
be detected by Modules 2 and 3 through the DIO duplication of the sequence number received.
This detection is straightforward, fast and accurate because it does not need to collect much IDS
information to decide.
Table 4. TPR and FPR of Rank attack, sinkhole attack and Neighbor attack after 4 min.
FP TP FN TN TPR (%) FPR (%)
RA 0 88 0 7656 100 0
SA 0 88 0 7656 100 0
NA 0 88 0 7656 100 0
Our IDS shows high accuracy results not long after the attack initiating. However, when letting
the IDS works for a long time, when the TPR is still ideal, the FPR increases significantly and makes
the IDS become less accurate. For example, the TPR and FPR after 10 min detecting RA, SA and
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NA scenarios are shown in Table 5 below. The figure shows that the FPR increase to about 2%–5%.
The reason is that the initiated attacks in the tampered nodes have affected its neighbors around, make
those nodes work the same way as the attackers, and therefore become difficult to separate.
Table 5. TPR and FPR of Rank attack, sinkhole attack and Neighbor attack after 10 min.
FP TP FN TN TPR (%) FPR (%)
RA 402 88 0 7254 100 5.25
SA 251 88 0 7405 100 3.28
NA 202 88 0 7454 100 2.64
In order to minimize the FPR, the nodes which are detected as the malicious source should be
removed from the network, for example, by adding to a blacklist and asking all other relevant nodes
to skip nodes in that list. After removing the nodes, the IDS will stop judging for a certain time to help
to stabilize the network before restarting in a new detection cycle.
The second group of attacks includes the Local repair and the DIS attack. The difference to
compare with the first group is that in this group, observing that a node visit a state is not enough
to conclude this node to be malicious. This observation is only considered as part of the statistic
evidences. Only when a node visits a state more than a threshold of times during a period, the IDS has
the right to raise alarm about the threat.
The mechanisms to detect attacks in the second group are as follows. In local repair attack, after
initiating the local repair mechanism, the node sends the poison messages to the neighborhood in
which its rank is reset to be infinite and it needs to resend the DIS to obtain the routing information
around. The local repair will be reported after several times initiated according to Module 1. On the
other hand, the local repair also invokes the high instability value in Module 5, so it will also be
reported by this module.
In the DIS attack, the attacker needs to send DIS messages to force the neighbor to change the DIO
trickle time, or to send the unicast DIO back. In any case, it will increase the DIS statistic in Module 1
and will be reported by the DIS.
Tables 6 and 7 below present the TPR and FPR detection of this group after 8 and 12 min. As can
be seen from the figures, after 8 min, the IDS may not collect enough information in any of the cases
so it cannot detect the Local repair attack and DIS attack, which results in a high FN and low TPR.
On the other hand, after 12 min, the IDS collect all the needed information, so the FN and TPR are
ideal. However, the Local repair and DIS attack is given long time enough to manipulate the neighbors
around the malicious node to create the instability in the topology. Such instability is presented through
the high rate of FP and FPR which make the IDS become less accurate because of detecting normal
nodes as attackers. Therefore, there is a tradeoff between the TPR and FPR in detecting threats in
this group.
Table 6. TPR and FPR of Rank attack, sinkhole attack and Neighbor attack after 8 min.
FP TP FN TN TPR (%) FPR (%)
LA 51 76 12 7605 86.36 0.67
DIS 232 83 5 7424 94.32 3.03
Table 7. TPR and FPR of Rank attack, sinkhole attack and Neighbor attack after 12 min.
FP TP FN TN TPR (%) FPR (%)
LA 519 88 0 7137 100 6.78
DIS 453 88 0 7203 100 5.92
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Unlike the first group of attacks, where the attackers are always detected first before any FP
happens, in the second group, a benign node can be detected as malicious before the attackers are
revealed. Therefore, using a blacklist or other mechanism to eliminate the detected nodes in this case
may not be appropriate. An alternative solution is to adjust the frequency threshold to adapt to the
frequency of the corresponding Local repair/DIS attack in specific scenario through learning from
simulation. A good chosen threshold will optimize the detection rate and accurateness of the IDS.
It is worth to mention that in general, the specification-based IDS has the ability to detect the
new attacks because it focuses on checking the legitimacy of the protocol operation rather than on
any specific attack behaviors. Similarly, our proposed IDS aims at monitoring the optimal network
topology and its stability as a whole, which is broader than just verifying illegitimate behaviors
created by some specific internal attacks. Hence, it will also have the ability to detect other topology
attacks which are not mentioned in this paper, if those attacks breaking the optimal topology or create
network instability.
4.3.2. Energy Efficiency
We run the simulation in RPL-collect network (the sink collect environment data from every
other nodes) with and without our IDS integration and obtain the energy and power consumption as
calculated in Formulas (1) and (2) in Section 4.2. In normal RPL network, the energy is around 190J,
while in the RPL with IDS integration, the average energy consumption is about 202J, which represents
an increase of 6.3%. This is a lot more saving to compare with the IDS in [6], where the overhead is
30% for a setup of 64 nodes (the overhead would be larger if they setup for the same 100 nodes like
our setup). The reason for this saving is that we only limit the IDS work locally, where monitoring
nodes only need to deal with 8–12 nodes in average, instead of sending all the IDS data to one IDS
center. In this paper, we implement between 8 and 12 nodes in each cluster for the experiment set-up.
In other scenarios with denser network, the number of nodes in each cluster can be higher, which leads
to slightly more energy consumption. Besides, the average power consumption in each node increases
slightly 6.3% with 1.2 mW in IDS integration scenario to compare with 1.05 mW in normal scenario.
This indicates that the network lifetime will not be affected much once implementing the IDS.
5. Further Considerations on Expanding the IDS Capability to Detect More Internal Threats
Topology attack is only one type of internal threats that can happen with the RPL-based network.
The nature of the specification-based IDS makes it suitable to detect this type of attack because all
the collected monitoring data and set of rules can be used straight forward for detect the illegitimate
protocol behaviors with small amount of overhead and little requirement on storage and computing.
As aforementioned, this work is only part of our on-going research on detecting the internal threats.
In detail, besides topology attacks, there are still other internal threats that aim at performance directly,
as discussed comprehensively in our previous work [2]. Apart from the protocol side, node behaviors
also depend on other conditions such as applications, environments and so on. The set of protocol
rules obtained from the specification-based IDS cannot reflect node behaviors regarding such aspects,
therefore, it may not be effective in dealing with the performance-type internal threats. For example,
internal adverse can follow the protocol operation yet still manipulating other performance behaviors
such as sending, forwarding or controlling activities at the lower layer. To deal with this type of
internal threats, a more proper anomaly-based IDS technique needs to be applied. As the accuracy of
any anomaly-based IDS will correlate to the robustness of the detection algorithm and the amount of
monitoring data that the system collected, the storage and computation capability need to be extended
more. Note that the specification-based IDS in this paper collects only a small amount of monitoring
data, while using simple comparing and checking algorithms, therefore, the cluster head can still adapt
with the storage and computation workload. However, if we want to employ anomaly-based IDS with
larger monitoring data and more robust detection algorithm such as Bayesian network or other data
mining techniques, the cluster monitoring architecture will not be able to deliver.
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To enable the use of a more robust anomaly-based IDS working on a larger amount of monitoring
data, we envisage an architecture that can extend the computation and storage capability of the IDS
massively, yet still keep the network overhead low and acceptable for operating. In detail, we extend
the cluster monitoring architecture by first making benefit from the multiple-interface design that
allows the sensor devices to communicate in different channels. One real life example is the Libelium
Waspmote devices that allow many wireless communication standards such as Wifi, 3G, GSM, GPRS,
LoRa, and so on apart from sensor data transmission [16]. We can use the multi-interface sensor
devices as the cluster heads to communicate both in RPL-based network and another overlay network,
which supports high speed, long distance, and low power consumption transmission. There are many
options for such overlay network, for example, the IEEE 802.11, LTE, 3G, etc. By doing so, we aim
at transferring the IDS monitoring data directly to an IDS server through the overlay network by
the extra interface. To compare with the network-based architecture, sending IDS data to the server
through the overlay channel will eliminate many communicational issues such as overhead, delay,
packet loss, etc. Moreover, we propose to implement the Cloud Computing [17] application at the IDS
server. The IDS work deal by the server only before now can be delegated to many other computers in
the Cloud, which helps to enable the IDS computation and storage capability massively. The additional
cost for implementing this architecture is only a little, given the reasonable price of multi-interface
cluster heads, IDS data collection, and Cloud Computing service. The benefit of this architecture will
be the allowance to use many robust IDS algorithms on large amounts of IDS data, so as to have
higher accuracy in dealing with many other internal threats effectively, while can be scalable well in
large-scale network. An illustration of this vision can be seen in Figure 7 below.Information 2016, 7, 25 
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6. Conclusions
This paper aimed at detecting the attacks on the RPL based network topology that jeopardizing
the network operational optimality and stability. The considered attacks include the Rank, the Sinkhole,
the Local Repair, the Neighbor, and DIS attack. These threats can affect different aspects of network
performance, from directly such as increase the end to end delay or create more packet loss,
to indirectly like exhausting the resources of the nodes by communicational and computational
overhead. Our detection solution involves semi-auto building a specification-based IDS model for
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protecting RPL-based network topology. The main idea is to learn the states, transitions, and relevant
statistic based on the analyzing the trace file. The generated model will be integrated in the IDS server,
which connects to the network through many cluster interfaces. The simulation results show that our
IDS is energy efficiency and applicable for the large-scale networks, while providing high detection
rates and accurateness in revealing most of the topology attacks. In the future, with the envisaged IDS
architecture in Section 5, we would like to develop a more robust anomaly-based IDS for detecting
performance-attacks type of the internal threats, for example, the black hole, selective forwarding or
wormhole attack. We believe the extension of IDS capability in storage and computation will allow
detection of internal threats more accurately and efficiently.
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The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:
6LoWPAN IPv6 over Low-power Wireless Personal Area Network
DAO Destination Advertisement Object
DIO Destination Oriented DAG Information Objective
DIS DODAG Information Solicitation
FN False Negative
FP False Positive
FPR False Positive Rate
LA Local Repair Attack
LTE Long-Term Evolution
NA Neighbor Attack
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IoT Internet of Things
RA Rank attack
RPL Routing Protocol for Low Power and lossy network
SA Sinkhole Attack
TN True Negative
TP True Positive
TPR True Positive Rate
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